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Milk quota systems: Considerations of market and welfare effects 
Introduction 
  Generally, a production quota is a limit imposed on the quantity produced. Milk quotas 
were often introduced to control the growth of surplus production and budgetary expenditures, to 
maintain market price support, and to provide price stability for dairy farmers.  
  The economic theory relating to how quotas impact on markets or, more specifically, on 
supply, resource allocation and welfare is well established. Typically, the welfare effects of quotas 
are compared with the free market situation with the standard conclusion that quota systems are 
inefficient and cause considerable transfers from consumers to producers (for an example, see 
Veeman 1982). Harvey (1984) argued that in a political-economy context adoption of quotas may 
result in increased welfare as measured against a status quo policy that generates even greater 
distortions and misallocation of resources. Guyomard and Mahé (1994) agreed that quotas could 
be a welfare improving policy instruments, but argued that welfare gains to be expected from the 
corrective quota instruments are overestimated in a static approach compared to a dynamic 
approach.   
  The initial inefficiencies and emergence of quota rent following the milk quota 
implementation have also been elaborated in the literature (Harvey, 1984; Burrell, 1989; Dawson, 
1991; and Colman et al, 1998). This strand of literature illustrates that after a quota imposition, 
low-cost efficient milk production is impeded at the expense of high-cost inefficient production.  
When a quota system allows quota to be traded or leased, the efficient producers would lease or 
buy quota from less efficient producers and the rental price in a competitive market would be bid 
to a rate equal to the difference between support price and marginal cost – hence the emergence of  
 3  
quota rent.  Dawson (1991) argues that the main criticism of quota systems concerns the tendency 
for quotas to acquire value.   
  Although the key concept of quota system is simple – to set a limit on production – the 
consequences of operating such a system are far reaching and often not foreseen by the quota 
advocates.  The quota system impacts on all facets associated with production, it influences 
structural changes in agriculture, the structure of the dairy processing sector, welfare of producers 
and input suppliers (to some extent consumers)
1, the value of assets in agriculture, production 
risks, the uptake of new technologies and, of course, production levels and trade. A large body of 
literature exists that have examined the characteristics and effects of quota systems. 
  This paper is based on work undertaken by the OECD Secretariat in analysing dairy 
policy reform and trade liberalisation (OECD, 2005).  A part of this broad study has also 
examined the trade and economic effects of milk quotas.  This examination of milk quotas can not 
be compared to the extensive reports investigating milk quota feasibility such as those by Colman 
et al. (2003) and INRA-Wageningen (2002).  Nevertheless, among other things, this paper 
highlights two important aspects relevant to an evaluation of quota systems which have been 
sometimes overlooked in the literature and political discussion.  Both aspects are discussed in this 
paper in turn.  
  First, the paper draws attention to trade-offs that exist among the individual policy tools 
and given policy objectives.  Second, the paper illustrates some important welfare effects of a 
quota system for owners of farm resources and suppliers of inputs that are not often considered in 
the literature.  Although each part of this paper touches on a different aspect or problem area 
                                                       
1 Although consumers are typically not affected directly by a quota system, the presence of quota may facilitate a 
continuation of high price support measures which indeed do influence consumers.  4  
related to quota, the intention is mutual; to stimulate discussion and extend the understanding of 
the economic impacts of quota systems.  
  
Quota interactions with other policy objectives 
  The setting of the level of quota represents an important policy decision which interacts 
with the effects of other policy tools. The impacts on world and domestic dairy markets of 
changes in the level of quota are conditional on the decision regarding other policy objectives. 
That is, the quota level has a direct influence on exports and government expenditure on 
subsidised exports within the objective of holding the supported domestic price unchanged. On 
the other hand the level of quota determines the cuts in domestic prices required to achieve other 
objectives such as holding exports or government expenditure on subsidised exports unchanged.   
  The relationship between the quota and certain policy objectives might be illustrated 
using a simple diagram. Figure  1 schematically depicts the trade-off between the supported 
domestic price and the quota level given that the policy objective is to leave government 
expenditure on subsidised exports unchanged. Consider that at the initial level of the supported 
domestic price PS and milk quota Q* consumption equals quantity QDS  of milk while Q*−QDS  is 
exported with export subsidies equal to (Q*−QDS )×(PS − PW ). Holding the supported domestic 
price constant and increasing the quota to the new level QN* increases taxpayers costs (export 
subsidies) by (QN*−Q*)×(PS − PW ).
2 
  Nevertheless, policy makers can, for a given level of quota, reduce the supported 
domestic price so that government expenditure (taxpayers’ costs) on subsidised exports would not 
be affected. Figure  1 illustrates that in order to keep government expenditure unchanged, the 
                                                       
2 The level of quota is proportional to taxpayers cost. For example, assuming half of the milk production is consumed 
domestically, a one percent increase in quota level translates to two percent increase in taxpayers’ cost 
(holding the support price constant).   
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domestic price has to be reduced to a new level PN  for which the lighter shaded area equals the 
darker shaded area in the diagram. That is, the export subsidies before and after quota increase 
must be equal; mathematically expressed (Q*−QDS )×(PS − PW ) = (QN*−QDN )×(PN − PW ). Note 
that under the new price (PN) consumers will consume a higher quantity (QDN.).
3 A different 
scenario can be constructed to evaluate the increase of quota with the objective of holding the 
volume of dairy product exports constant. In the analytical framework of Figure 2 this scenario 
could be described as follows: “By how much would the price (PS ) have to be lowered to a new 
level (PN ) so that for a given increase in quota (from Q* to QN*) the volume of exports remains 
constant (Q*−QDS = QN*−QDN ).” Note that in this scenario the darker shaded area in Figure 1 
would be smaller than the lighter shaded area, suggesting that government expenditure on exports 
would be reduced, by how much remains an empirical question.  
  In order to evaluate numerically the relationship between the quota level and supported 
domestic prices under specific economic parameters and policy objectives, empirical analysis has 
been carried out using the Aglink model.
4  Following the analytical example of Figure 1, the 
specific question to be addressed by the first empirical experiment is “how much would domestic 
prices have to be lowered to accommodate a given increase in milk quota while holding 
government expenditures on export subsidies constant?” As the level of the quota is exogenous in 
only one country/region in Aglink – the European Union (EU) – the EU module is used to set up 
the scenario. 
                                                       
3 It should also be noted that for simplicity the figure represents a small country case which does not have a 
substantial impact on world markets and prices. For a large country the world price would have to be 
reduced in the diagram to reflect the impact of increased exports. 
4 Aglink is a policy specific, partial equilibrium, dynamic model developed at the OECD. The simulation experiments 
are conducted using the baseline data of the Agricultural Outlook baseline 2003-2008 published in OECD 
(2003). The dairy component of this model covers production and consumption of milk and main milk 
products in major OECD and several non-member economy markets, covering both importers and 
exporters.   6  
  While Figure 1 depicts the analytics in terms of milk price and milk quantities, in reality 
milk is often priced and traded in the form of dairy products. Thus, theoretically there are a large 
number of permutations for adjusting individual dairy product exports while holding the overall 
government expenditure on exports constant. For the sake of transparency, the objective of 
holding the government expenditures on exports constant is achieved by holding the government 
expenditures on exports for each dairy product constant at the baseline level.  
  The results for a 1 percent, 1.5 and 2 percent increase in milk production quota 
respectively  are presented in the first three columns in Table 1 under the heading “Government 
expenditures constant”. The table illustrates, for example, that if the milk quota were to be 
increased by 1 per cent, then the required stability in export subsidy expenditures would be 
achieved by a simultaneous reduction in the butter price of more than 3% and an increase in 
exports of butter by 5.1 percent.
 5  The producer price of milk in this scenario would fall by 2.4 
percent.  World prices for all dairy products would be reduced as a result of increased exports 
from the European Union, which is a dominant player on world dairy markets. The results for the 
scenarios show increases in almost linear fashion (Table 1).
 6   
The results of the scenario where the policy objective is to increase quota while keeping export 
volumes fixed are reported in the last three columns of Table 1 under the heading “Volume of 
exports constant”. Comparing the results of the first and second experiment the results for the 
second show more profound cuts in dairy product and milk producer prices as the internal market 
clearing is not aided by additional exports.  Government expenditures on subsidised exports 
                                                       
5 Note that export subsidies are limited by the WTO both, in volume and value terms, which prevents any increase 
over these limits. In this respect the scenario must be viewed as purely illustrative as no account is taken of 
the respective WTO limits on the volume of subsidised exports. 
6 Note that butter prices would have to be reduced substantially more than those for SMP. These results stem to some 
extent from the fact that in Aglink the EU demand for fat is specified as being less elastic than demand for 
non-fat solids  
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would be reduced for all dairy products with the highest reduction seen for butter, again followed 
by WMP, cheese and SMP. 
  As the volume of exports is held at the baseline level, the second scenario could be 
expected to have a negligible impact on world dairy prices. However, as Table 1 indicates, the 
impact on world dairy prices is non-trivial. This outcome reflects the New Zealand market access 
quota for butter to the EU market.  As a consequence of this special access, the New Zealand 
butter export price in Aglink is partly determined by the world butter price and partly by that on 
the EU domestic market. As the EU price falls in the Aglink scenario, it reduces the rent accruing 
to New Zealand producers and ultimately reduces the butter prices in New Zealand. Channelling 
milk from butter to the production of other dairy products increases New Zealand exports of these 
products and reduces exports of butter.  As expected the world butter price increases, while those 
for other dairy products fall. 
 
Welfare effects of a quota system for owners of farm resources and suppliers of inputs 
  When a quota is set at a level that is above quantity demanded domestically at set support 
prices, then the quota by itself has no direct consequence for consumers assuming that support 
prices are held constant.  However, the producer welfare impacts of quota policies are not 
straightforward largely owing to the presence of quota rent.  The quota is typically a licence to sell 
milk at the supported price and as such becomes valuable in its own right. The quota rent (unit 
value of quota) then reflects the difference between an underlying cost of production and a milk 
price. 
  The standard welfare implications of quota imposition suggests that producers would 
loose if the quantity supplied at current support prices is restricted by a quota level. But would 
they? The simple analytical framework found in standard textbooks on welfare economics  8  
typically assumes that producer surplus accrues to the owner of relatively fixed assets (typically 
land, in the case of farmers) under the condition that supplies of variable factors are perfectly 
elastic. Thus, prices in other markets are assumed fixed or unaffected by intervention in the 
market of consideration.  However, in reality, the supply of inputs is not infinitely elastic.  For 
example, when support price increases it tends to increase price of agricultural inputs as 
production expansion - under the new support price - increases demand for inputs.  Hence, for any 
support instrument that increases derived demand for purchased farm inputs, the net welfare gain 
to farmers is likely to be overestimated, using the corresponding producer surplus gain, by the 
amount of income gains accruing to input suppliers.  
  The extension of the standard welfare analysis which relaxes the assumption of perfectly 
elastic supply of inputs is provided in Just et al. al (1982, Chapter 9).  In this framework the 
supply (equilibrium adjustment) curve reflects the induced increases in factor prices (the area 
below the curve) but also reflects the increases in surplus to all inelastically supplied factors (the 
area above the supply curve).  It follows that the producer surplus is distributed across farmers 
and other input suppliers.  In other words, in the long run the benefits of market price support are 
shared by farmers’ own resources and by input suppliers.   
  The exact derivation of the equilibrium supply curve is illustrated in Just et al, so that 
only the consequences for quota systems are considered here. It is not easy to illustrate this 
phenomenon in a graph so that relatively simple and transparent description is presented.  For ease 
of exposition, it is assumed that 50% of surplus goes to farmers’ owned resources and 50% goes 
to input suppliers. Figure 2 illustrates the hypothetical 50-50 partition of surplus on the basis of 
farmers’ owned resources and purchased input suppliers.  
  The figure shows that prior to quota imposition farmers would produce Q tonnes of milk 
at the price PS0 with the producer surplus equal to the sum of the areas a+b+c+x+y+z. By  
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construction of the experiment the area a+b+c represents 50% of the total producer surplus and 
depicts return accruing to farmers’ own resources under the assumptions of this simple exercise. 
The area x+y+z represents the remaining 50% of the total producer surplus and are the returns 
accruing to input suppliers, again, reflecting the assumption explained in the previous paragraph. 
If trade in dairy products is fixed such that the domestic price of milk is set to clear the domestic 
market, then after applying quota of Q*, a price rise from Ps0 to Ps1 is required, and the quota 
assumes value corresponding to area a+x+d while returns to factors other than quota are reduced 
to area b+y. The quota system results in input suppliers losing an amount equal to area x+z. 
Farmers (to the extent that they hold relatively fixed assets, such as land) loose c but gain x, 
formerly input suppliers surplus, as part of quota rent.  
  If domestic demand is determined by a target price, such that trade is determined by 
excess supply, then assuming the domestic price after application of a quota remains at Ps, quota 
value will be equal to a+x and return to factors is reduced to b+y at a marginal cost of Pc.  Again, 
input suppliers see their returns reduced by x+z.  Farmers lose factor rent a+c but gain a+x as 
quota rent; x is a transfer from input suppliers to producers because of the quota.
7   
  The example above could be also reversed to show that an increase in the quota level 
allows part of the producer surplus to be recaptured by input suppliers due to rising demand for 
purchased inputs so that milk producers may loose due to the quota rent erosion.  Whether farmer 
would loose or gain remain an empirical question and very much depend on the share of surplus 
split between farmer’s owned factors of production and suppliers of purchased inputs and the size 
of the production restriction.
8 
                                                       
7 In that case, when domestic demand is less than Q*, exports will need tax payer support given that world price 
would normally be less than PS0. 
8 The OECD PEM model was used to evaluate the impact of a percentage increase in the EU quota.  The analysis 
shows that the increase in quota quantity is insufficient to compensate for the decline in unit quota rent.   10 
  It should be noted that the capture of input suppliers’ surplus as quota rent by farmers 
explains, in part, the high transfer efficiency of quota programs.  Transfer efficiency measures the 
effectiveness of a policy instrument in transferring income to farmers. The definition and 
discussion on transfer efficiency of agricultural support policies can be found in OECD (1995). In 
brief, transfer efficiency is defined as the ratio of farm income change to change in program 
expenditure, in the form of either consumer or taxpayer costs. More generally, removing the 
ability of producers to react to price changes at the margin allows for related market price support 
policies to be highly transfer efficient, as this production response is a key determinant of transfer 
efficiency (OECD 2001). To illustrate the change in transfer efficiency of price support resulting 
from the imposition of a quota system, consider two alternatives using the setup in Figure 2. The 
first is an increase in price support (either as MPS or output support payments) from Pc to Ps0 
without quota, and the second an increase from Ps0 to Ps1 with quota set at Q*. The first case, 
increasing price from Pc to Ps0, without quota, induces a production increase from Q* to Q, with a 
cost in terms of MPS level or required total payments equal to the area a+c+e+x+z.  Of this, the 
producer gets a+c, the balance lost to input suppliers and deadweight. The ratio 
(a+c)/(a+c+e+x+z) then defines the transfer efficiency. In the second case, where support applied 
to raise prices from Ps0 to Ps1 with production fixed by quota at Q*, program cost is equal to area 
d, and the increase in producer welfare (through quota rent) is also d, yielding a transfer efficiency 
of 1, the highest possible.
9 
  Although quota systems increase the transfer efficiency of support it is important to 
reiterate that the benefits of quota in terms of producer surplus will be in the long run capitalised 
                                                                                                                                                                             
That is, returns to farm-owned inputs increase but not enough to fully compensate for the reduced value of 
quota. Indeed, the input suppliers’ surplus increases because the price of inputs has increased following the 
increase in derived demand (See OECD (2005) for more details). 
9 Note, the high transfer efficiency applies at the margin under binding quota.   
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into the value of quota. If quota is tied to land, the benefits will be capitalised into the value of 
land.
10  This is indeed a general problem of any increase in farm net returns but the added 
complexity in quota systems is that the share of benefits flowing to owners of farm resources is 
magnified at the expense of input suppliers and the rent accruing to quota reduces the surplus 
accruing to traditional resources.  
  
Conclusions 
  This paper is based on work undertaken by the OECD Secretariat in examining the trade 
and economic effects of milk quotas.  Two important aspects relevant to an evaluation of quota 
systems are discussed.  First, when evaluating a quota system, it is important to keep in mind that 
a quota is typically contingent on the existence of another policy, namely market price support, 
and, in many milk producing countries, that market price support is in turn often contingent on the 
presence of quota. Simply removing production controls without also eliminating market price 
support would likely be unsustainable; conversely, in the absence of a policy that raises domestic 
prices over world prices, there is little rationale for limiting the quantity that domestic producers 
may offer in the marketplace. Thus, quota interacts with the effects of other policy tools and 
impacts on markets within a context of specific policy objectives.  That is, quota has a direct 
influence on exports and government expenditures on subsidised exports within the objective of 
holding the supported domestic price unchanged. The quota level also determines the cuts in 
domestic prices required to achieve other objectives such as holding exports or government 
expenditure on subsidised exports unchanged. The actual trade-off between the policy tools is 
dependant on specific economic parameters.   
                                                       
10 For further discussion and some empirical evidence on capitalising government program benefits to quota see 
Oskam and Speijers (1992) and Barichello (1996).    12 
  Welfare analysis of such a trade-off must also take into account certain issues related to 
defining producer surplus. The second part of the paper discussed important welfare implication 
of operating quota which has been often overlooked in the literature.  The simple analytical 
framework found in standard textbooks on welfare economics typically assumes that producer 
surplus accrues to the owner of relatively fixed assets under the condition that supplies of variable 
factors are perfectly elastic. As, in reality, the supply of inputs is not infinitely elastic the producer 
surplus is shared between farmers and other input suppliers. Thus, provided that part of the 
primary factors of production are not owned by the farm family and prices for purchase farm 
inputs are not perfectly elastic (input prices are not fixed) the measured “standard” producer 
surplus change may understate net benefits to farmers of a quota system.  The standard analytical 
framework does not reflect cost saving due to potentially lower input prices.  Nevertheless, this 
fact may only aggravate the vested interests inherent to a quota and hinder reforms on price 
support later on. 
  It is thus important to bear in mind that although quota system increases transfer 
efficiency of market price support, a quota system is unlikely to be considered as the best policy 
option. This is due to the inefficiencies that it may create, the cost that it imposes on consumers, 
the difficulties and costs of administration that may arise for governments, the difficulty in getting 
the information on the quota level that would match production (or trade) under free trade and the 
vested interests that it generates. Moreover, quota systems allow a domestic market to be managed 
only if that market is isolated from external sources of supply. Quota imposition provides gains 
for initial beneficiaries, but subsequent generations can be locked into a higher cost structure, and 
the system then perpetuates itself. Thus, the above analysis is here presented from a 
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Table 1. Impacts of quota increases on key variables (average changes from baseline for the EU) 
 
 
    Government expenditures constant  Volume of exports constant 
Variable Product  %change %change %change %change %change %change 
Quantity Milk  1.0 1.5 2.0 1.0 1.5 2.0 
Butter -3.1  -4.6  -6.0 -4.9 -7.3 -9.7 
Cheese  -1.4 -2.0 -2.7 -1.9 -2.8 -3.7 
SMP  -0.9 -1.4 -1.9 -0.2 -0.3 -0.4 




Milk    -2.4 -3.6 -4.7 -3.0 -4.4 -5.9 
Butter 5.1 7.8  10.5 0  0  0 
Cheese 2.3  3.5  4.6  0  0  0 




  WMP 2.7  4.0  5.4 0  0  0 
Butter 0  0  0  -8.7  -12.9  -17.0 
Cheese 0  0  0  -3.4 -5.0 -6.7 




Exports  WMP 0 0 0  -6.6  -9.8  -12.9 
Butter -0.6  -0.9  -1.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 
Cheese  -0.3 -0.4 -0.6 -0.1 -0.1 -0.2 
SMP  -0.1 -0.2 -0.2 0.0 -0.1 -0.1 
World Prices 
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Figure 2. Quota imposition favours farm owners at the expense of input suppliers 
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